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Abstract: In the process of internationalization of construction contractors, international enterprises
as main contractors (IMC) need to consider whether part of the contract should be subcontracted
to local subcontractors (LSC) to gain a competitive advantage when competing with local main
contractors (LMC). The involvement of local subcontractors can usually help reduce cost through
the cost spillover effect. However, it should be noted that the share of local subcontractors with
local main contractors with an inferior quality may lead to quality spillover. The Hotelling model is
therefore adopted to investigate the subcontracting decisions of main contractors considering both
cost and quality spillover effects. Many scenarios are simulated and the results show that LMCs with
inferior quality can always choose the subcontracting strategy to obtain increased profit regardless
of the strategy that IMCs adopt. On the other hand, IMCs need to balance the cost spillover of
subcontracting and the quality spillover for improving the quality level of LSCs. The results are
useful for contractors to make decisions that are relevant to the adoption of subcontracting strategies
to obtain competitive advantages.
Keywords: spillover effect; subcontracting; decision making; hotelling model; internationalization
1. Introduction
International outsourcing is a cooperation mechanism between enterprises in different countries
or regions. In the process of global supply chain integration, the advantages of different countries,
such as manpower, technology, knowledge, and energy, can be effectively integrated to reduce costs
and increase efficiency. As a special type of commodity, infrastructure projects require the integration
of resources to achieve expected project outcomes. According to Du et al. [1], partnering with local
suppliers and subcontractors can help secure governments’ approval and address local residents’
concerns. Wang et al. [2] also found that using local or shared suppliers can enhance supplier reliability,
which is often more important than cost. Therefore, selecting subcontractors is a common problem
that needs to be solved by international contractors.
At the same time, we have noticed that such a trend has occurred in the construction of mega
projects, and it is increasingly inclined to use factory prefabricated methods for manufacturing.
For example, the steel box girder of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge is prefabricated in several
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production bases which are distributed throughout China. After prefabrication and centralized splicing,
large-segment installations are carried out on site. In such a scenario, cooperation and competition
often coexist [3,4]. Factory prefabrication is an environmentally friendly way of building, avoiding
a large number of on-site construction, and then producing in a factory environment. It has been
successfully applied in an increasing number of projects. It is one of the important ways in which the
construction industry can achieve sustainability. With the prevalence of prefabricated and modular
buildings, the construction of mega projects has also moved forward to the factory, allowing owners
to make purchasing decisions with a broader perspective, including contractor selection in a larger
space with the consideration of shipping length, time, and risk. When international contractors enter
the local market, localized subcontracting is also an important way to reduce costs and resolve risks.
Local subcontracting is also a double-edged sword. On one hand, it reduces costs and on the other
hand, it also causes knowledge spillover, such as the development of high-speed rail technology
in globalization. Therefore, adopting a conservative strategy to better protect corporate intellectual
property rights, or adopting an expansion strategy to minimize costs and obtain economic benefits
is a sustainable consideration for international business operations. Therefore, for international
prefabrication contractors, what kind of strategy is adopted to compete with local contractors for
price competition, and whether it is necessary to subcontract the contract locally are both important
decisions that need to be prudent.
Due to the importance of selecting subcontractors in construction projects, subcontracting-related
issues are common research problems in construction research. One of the most important problems
is subcontractor selection (SCS). Most SCS-related studies focus on the development of appropriate
decision support systems [5] and the application of internet technologies to assist the selection of
subcontractors [6]. The most commonly adopted methods in subcontractor selection include fuzzy
preferences to establish a comprehensive model [7], continuous ant colony and fuzzy set theory [8],
and computer-supported systems to reduce the disadvantages of a single method [9]. The evaluation
of subcontractors has also attracted significant attention. Some notable developments related to the
evaluation of subcontractors include identifying key performance indicators for subcontractors [10,11],
testing the relative importance of evaluation elements, and establishing or developing relevant
evaluation frameworks [12,13]. Other studies focus on the study of cooperatives relationships among
contractors, including testing the relationship between fairness preferences or relationship value and
subcontractors’ willingness to cooperate [14], which are the key determinants of trust between main
contractors and subcontractors [15], and the effects of creating an engineering culture to improve
system capabilities [16].
Previous studies mainly focus on the general issues of selecting and evaluating subcontractors.
However, specific considerations of the local environment are not usually included. As Ulubeyli and
Kazaz [7] pointed out, if international contractors do not have experience in undertaking projects in the
host country, they may face various risk types when conducting business. Therefore, seeking local and
qualified subcontractors becomes an important way to reduce risks and increase profits [17]. Generally,
subcontracting is needed when main contractors do not have the necessary production capacity, or
have the production capacity but choose to subcontract because of the potential benefits of involving
a local subcontractor. In the second scenario, the main contractors have to evaluate the scope of the
work to be subcontracted before a selection decision can be made. However, many studies on supplier
selection do not consider such differences. For example, Jadidi et al. [18] proposed a multi-objective
optimization model for supplier selection based on three criteria, namely price, rejects, and lead-time.
Kannan et al. [19] developed a fuzzy axiomatic design approach to help identify and select appropriate
green suppliers. These studies are supplier-oriented, indicating the proposed models and methods are
simply developed to evaluate the competency of suppliers.
However, if the main contractors have the production capacity and choose to invest in local
suppliers, a quality/knowledge spillover will occur and may benefit local suppliers, which can
sometimes be a threat to the main contractors as the competition level increases [20]. As such,
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the impact of the spillover cannot be overlooked when selecting local suppliers. The Hotelling
model is a commonly adopted approach when buyers’ preferences are considered in a duopoly
market. The duopoly market is a simplified scenario and can be referred to when analyzing a more
complicated oligopoly market. In addition, the Hotelling model has the benefits of providing accurate
price equilibrium and is therefore ideal to evaluate the economic implications of subcontracting.
Given these issues, the situation considered in this paper is a linear distribution of owners,
which is consistent with the linear urban distribution assumed by the Hotelling model. For bridge
projects, it is often distributed along rivers or coastlines, showing typical linear characteristics.
For example, some large-quality components such as steel box girder transportation and land
transportation are often not economically viable, and contractors are often distributed on river banks
or coasts. When selecting a site, contractors often choose to stay away from each other to avoid fierce
competition in the same area. Therefore, we continue to consider a shared upstream supplier, and
cooperation with such subcontractors will reduce costs, and international contractors will also lead to
quality spillover effects through the intermediary role of this subcontractor. Such considerations
have not been seen in the current research of the Hotelling model. Under such circumstances,
international contractors need to balance the dual benefits of cost reduction and quality spillovers to
make optimal decisions.
In the Hotelling model, owners’ positions are linearly distributed, and international main
contractors (IMC) and local main contractors (LMC) are located in a position on the linear line.
Owners will choose the main contractor based on the principle of maximizing their own utility.
This paper therefore aims to: (1) Analyze the competition between IMC and LMC using the Hotelling
model; and (2) provide useful recommendations for selecting local suppliers while considering the
spillover effect.
This paper is presented in the following structure. Section 2 reviews the previous studies on
the spillover effect and modelling techniques. Section 3 presents the mathematical representations
of the Hotelling model. Sections 4–6 present the implementation of the Hotelling model in various
scenarios related to the adoption of subcontracting. A numerical simulation of the results is provided
in Sections 7 and 8 concludes the study.
2. Literature Review
Spillover effect is considered as a consequence of knowledge or productivity transfer [21].
While outsourcing can bring positive benefits to collaborative parties, the spillover effect has a
mixed impact on the cooperation between the two parties. In the cooperation, as Dussauge et al. [22]
pointed out, it is difficult for participants to control the boundary of knowledge investment. Hsuan
and Mahnke [23] argued that the investment in outsourcing can lead to knowledge spillover, thereby
reducing the advantages of the investor, especially when the selected supplier is a shared one.
Many studies are therefore conducted on how the spillover effect can impact supplier selection.
Qi et al. [24] found that when considering two competing companies investing in shared suppliers,
the spillover effect will increase competition and can hinder business investment. Kang et al. [25]
examined the effects of knowledge spillovers and reputation spillovers in OEM (original equipment
manufacturer) suppliers in Taiwan and found that knowledge and reputation spillover can generally
bring benefits to the suppliers. However, the suppliers’ actions towards economic gain may lead
to knowledge leakage, forcing the main contractors to implement more strict control. Similarly, in
this paper, international contractors choose to enter the local market, which has certain technical
advantages. This ensures that it can provide better quality than local contractors. The two contractors
in a competitive relationship do not have a large amount of interaction, which leads to the overflow of
knowledge, and once they choose to subcontract to the same upstream subcontractor, this situation will
be reversed. As Kang et al. [25] pointed out in the literature, investments in shared suppliers can have
positive inter-project spillover effect, while Qi et al. [24] indicated that as the ability of shared suppliers
is improved, market competition will be further aggravated. In this paper, considering the sharing of
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3291 4 of 17
the same upstream subcontractor, the quality improvement caused by the spillover of knowledge and
technology is called “quality spillover”.
For infrastructure projects, such as highways and tunnels, local construction standards are usually
adopted and the designs of the main functions and contents of the projects are mainly done by the
design organizations. The products provided by construction companies should help address the
various requirements during the life cycle of the projects [26]. What the contractors essentially provide
are normally considered as homogeneous construction products.
Hotelling [27] proposed the concept of transportation costs, pointing out that product pricing
includes costs and transportation costs of customers, and the Hotelling model has then become a classic
tool for analyzing product differentiation. Hotelling’s competition model is widely used in product
pricing and location selection decisions, as the location of the building has an important effect on the
utility of the building [28]. The model has also been used to decide technical locations for specialized
recycling processors in eco-industry parks [29], to analyze the long-term effects of the European gas
market on the rising gas prices in Russia [30], and to investigate the impact on space competition of
physical stores when joining online shops to supply external goods [31]. Recently, two studies are
identified to use the Hotelling model to investigate the supply chain structure. Liu and Tyagi [32]
used the Hotelling model to study the upward-decentralized supply chain structure and proposed
the theory of strategic benefits, finding that while upstream businesses have no cost advantage,
downstream businesses can still benefit from upward channel’s decentralization. In addition,
Hara and Matsubayashi [33] used the Hotelling model to analyze the relationship between retailer and
manufacturer and studied the decision of introducing premium store brands. The above two articles
use the Hotelling model to explore the two-tier structure of the supply chain, one is the subcontracting
with homogenized products, and the other is the issue between manufacturers and retailers. This paper
considers a two-tier supply chain structure close to their research, but further adds the considerations
that both of the main contractors’ upstream subcontractors are the same one [24], and quality spillover
effect will occur. This study, therefore, aims to use the Hotelling model to analyze the subcontracting
decisions between two main contractors (local and international) and that competitive advantages can
be obtained in various scenarios when the two main contractors cooperate with the same subcontractor.
3. Basic Model Assumptions
It is assumed the subcontracting decision-making of the main contractors is based on the Hotelling
model. This article only considers mega projects with linear distribution characteristics, typically
such as bridge engineering. Considering the cost and convenience of transportation, steel structure
contractors of a bridge are often distributed along rivers or coastlines, and transportation costs have
become one of the important factors considered by owners. Based on the model, the following
assumptions are necessary:
1. The location of the owner is linear and evenly distributed on the Hotelling line with a length of
1. The reservation unity u of the owner should be large enough to ensure that the owners are
interested in purchasing the products. The disutility of the owner is derived from the distance
from the contractor’s location. When the owner located at x purchases the products from the
contractor, he will gain the utility of:
U0 = u + θqi − pi − t(x− xi)2 (1)
where: U0 refers to the owner’s total utility; θ refers to owner’s utility coefficient related to
different quality level of the main contractor; qi refers to the quality level that exceeds the contract
requirement of the main contractor i; pi is the price of the main contractor i; xi refers to the
position of the main contractor i on the Hotelling line; θqi is the utility perception brought by
different qualities, here it refers to the quality requirements achieved on the basis of the contract,
such as the accuracy of the steel structure, the quality of the weld, the qualification rate of the
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metal flaw detection, etc.; −t(x− xi)2 is the disutility cost and t is the coefficient of disutility, As
d’Aspremont and Gabszewic [34] pointed out, if the disutility function is linear, the equalization
may not exist; the quadratic function is relatively simple, which can facilitate the formation of
equilibrium, and reflect the transportation risk increases with distance and time, resulting in
a nonlinear relationship of negative effects. In addition, when both the two main contractors
cooperate with the same subcontractor, as IMC has a relatively higher quality level, LMC can
obtain an increase in the quality level of α∆q (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) (hereinafter referred to as quality
spillover effect).
2. It is assumed there is competition between LMC and IMC. The position of the main contractor
lies in xi of the Hotelling line. LMC is located on the left side of IMC on the Hotelling line (i.e.,
x1 < x2), indicating that LMC has a relatively low quality level. It is also assumed that the costs
of the two main contractors are both set as c and neither of them has cost advantage [30].
3. It is also assumed there is an upstream LSC in the host country’s construction market, and LMC
and IMC both can cooperate with it. When the main contractors cooperate with the subcontractor,
an extensive exchange of knowledge and technologies will occur between the main contractor and
subcontractor, which will lead to a certain degree of cost spillover effect, where the production cost
of the main contractor i will be c1+ri . ri is the coefficient of the cost spillover effect. So, the profit
of LMC is Ej1 =
(
p1 − c1+r1
)
x∗ in scenario j, and the profit of IMC is Ej2 =
(
p2 − c1+r2
)
(1− x∗)
in scenario j, here x∗ refers to the position of with the same residual value of the owner on the
Hotelling line. As such, two types of spillover effect, including cost and quality, are considered in
this study.
Table 1 presents a summary of the notations that will be used in the modelling process.
Table 1. Summary of notations.
Notations Descriptions
u the reservation unity of the owner
θ the owner’s utility coefficient related to the main contractors’ quality level
qi the quality level of the main contractor i
∆q the quality difference between LMC and IMC
pi the price set by of the main contractor i
t the disutility coefficient of the owner
xi the position of the main contractor i on the Hotelling line
x the position of owner on the Hotelling line
x∗ The position of with the same residual value of the owner on the Hotelling line
c the cost of the main contractor
ri the coefficient of the cost spillover effect of the main contractor i
U0 the utility of the owner
α the coefficient of the quality spillover effect
Eji the profit of the main contractor i in scenario j
4. Scenario 1: Both Main Contractors Adopt the Centralized Structure
In order to investigate the various decision makings of IMCs and LMCs, a few scenarios will
be investigated. As both IMC and LMC can make independent decisions on subcontracting, a total
of four scenarios can be obtained, including: (1) Both contractors adopt the centralized structure; (2)
only LMC adopts the decentralized structure; (3) only IMC adopts the decentralized structure; and
(4) both contractors adopt the decentralized structure. It should be noted that in the last scenario
when both contractors adopt the decentralized structure, both cost and quality spillover effects should
be considered as the same subcontractor/supplier is shared. As such, a total of five scenarios will
be investigated.
We firstly assume that both main contractors have adopted the centralized structure. In this case,
all production services will take the form of self-provision rather than subcontracting. To study
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the impact of decentralized subcontract structure and spillover effect on the main contractor’s
decision-making, we use the centralized structure as a benchmark to compare contractors’ profitability
under different strategies.
The main contractors’ position on the Hotelling line is fixed, and they have the right to price the
product. According to their pricing, the owner can maximize his/her own residual value to make the
decision. In other words, there is a point x∗ on the Hotelling line, which can satisfy the condition that
the residual value of the two contractors should be the same. The formula is:
u + θq1 − p1 − t(x∗ − x1)2 = u + θq2 − p2 − t(x∗ − x2)2 (2)
The owner with a preference on the left side of the point can purchase the products from the LMC.
Similarly, the owner with a preference on the right side of the point can purchase the products from
the IMC.
From Equation (2), the formula of calculating the position where the residual value of two
contractors is:
x∗ = p2 − p1 − θ∆q
2t(x2 − x1) +
x2 + x1
2
(3)
For ease of calculation, the difference in quality between the two contractors is set as ∆q. At this
point, the profits of LMC and IMC can be calculated respectively as follows:
E1 = (p1 − c)x∗ (4)
E2 = (p2 − c)(1− x∗) (5)
The position with the same residual value of the owner is calculated by:
x∗ = x1 + x2 + 2
6
− θ∆q
6t(x2 − x1) (6)
The prices of LMC and IMC are respectively set as:
p1 =
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1) + 3c− θ∆q
3
(7)
p2 =
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + 3c + θ∆q
3
(8)
Given the prices and owner’s position above, the profits of the LMC and IMC are, respectively:
E11 =
[
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1)− θ∆q
]2
18t(x2 − x1) (9)
E12 =
[−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + θ∆q]2
18t(x2 − x1) (10)
5. One Main Contractor Adopts the Decentralized Structure
This section is concerned with the situation when one contractor uses the centralized structure
and the other uses the decentralized structure. In this situation, the profit function of the main
contractor using the centralized structure remains unchanged, while the main contractor choosing the
decentralized structure will enjoy the spillover effect brought by cooperation with LSC.
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5.1. Scenario 2: Only LMC Adopts the Decentralized Structure
If LMC chooses to subcontract, the position with the same residual value of the owner is similar
to that with the centralized structure (i.e., Equation (3)). LMC will benefit from the cost spillover
effect. Specifically, cost will be reduced to a certain extent, determined by the degree of cooperation
between the two enterprises. At this point, the profit of the enterprise with the decentralized structure
is expressed as E1 =
(
p1 − c1+r1
)
x∗. The profit of the IMC with centralized structure is still expressed
as E2 = (p2 − c)(1− x∗).
Therefore, if LMC chooses to subcontract and IMC does not, the prices of LMC and IMC are
respectively set as:
p1 =
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1) + c− θ∆q + 2c1+r1
3
(11)
p2 =
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + 2c + θ∆q + c1+r1
3
(12)
The position of with the same residual value of the owner is calculated by:
x∗ = x1 + x2 + 2
6
− θ∆q− c +
c
1+r1
6t(x2 − x1) (13)
The profits of LMC and IMC are therefore:
E21 =
[
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1)− θ∆q + cr11+r1
]2
18t(x2 − x1) (14)
E22 =
[
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + θ∆q− cr11+r1 ]2
18t(x2 − x1) (15)
When comparing the profits with the benchmark cases (i.e., Equations (9) and (10)), it is found
that when LMC chooses to subcontract and IMC chooses a centralized strategy, the profit of LMC will
increase and that of IMC will decrease.
From the price changes of the two main contractors, LMC has gained some cost advantage through
the spillover effect through subcontracting (i.e., cost spillover effect). During competition, LMC can
transform the cost advantage into a lower price, thus increasing the market share and occupying the
market share of the IMC. The price of the LMC has decreased by ∆p11 =
2r1c
1+r1
and similarly the price
of IMC is decreased by ∆p21 =
r1c
1+r1
. The position with the same residual value of the owner is moved
to the right of the Hotelling line, indicating that the market share of LMC will increase and that of IMC
will decrease. When compared with the benchmark case (Equation (6)), the difference is:
∆x∗1 =
cr1
6t(x2 − x1)(1 + r1) (16)
In this scenario, the profit change of LMC will become:
∆E11 =
[
2t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 4t(x2 − x1)− 2θ∆q + cr11+r1
]
cr1
1+r1
18t(x2 − x1) > 0 (17)
The profit of IMC decreases by:
∆E21 = −
[
−2t(x22 − x21)+ 8t(x2 − x1) + 2θ∆q− cr11+r1 ] cr11+r1
18t(x2 − x1) < 0 (18)
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The increased value of the profit of LMC is higher than the decreased value of the profit of
the IMC, as |∆E1| − |∆E2| > 0. This means that the market has benefited from the subcontracting
strategy of the LMC and the profit in the market has increased as a whole. As long as the cost spillover
effect exists, it must be profitable for LMC to adopt the subcontracting strategy when the competing
contractor adopts a centralized structure.
5.2. Scenario 3: Only IMC Adopts the Decentralized Structure
Similarly, when IMC adopts the subcontracting strategy, IMC will benefit from the cost spillover
effect. The profit of LMC is expressed as E1 = (p1 − c)x∗. The profit of the IMC with centralized
structure is still expressed as E2 =
(
p2 − c1+r2
)
(1− x∗).
The prices of LMC and IMC are respectively set as:
p1 =
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1)− θ∆q + 2c + c1+r2
3
(19)
p2 =
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + c + θ∆q + 2c1+r2
3
(20)
The position with the same residual value of the owner is calculated by:
x∗ = x1 + x2 + 2
6
− θ∆q + c−
c
1+r2
6t(x2 − x1) (21)
As a result, the profits of LMC and IMC are:
E31 =
[
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1)− θ∆q− cr21+r2
]2
18t(x2 − x1) (22)
E32 =
[
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + θ∆q + cr21+r2 ]2
18t(x2 − x1) (23)
When compared with the benchmark case (Equations (7) and (8)), it is found that as the cost of
IMC decreases, because of the cost spillover effect, both main contractors can adopt a price reduction
strategy. The price of LMC decreases by ∆p12 =
cr2
3(1+r2)
, while the price of IMC will decrease by
∆p22 =
2cr2
3(1+r2)
.
In this scenario, compared with the benchmark case (Equations (9) and (10)), the profit change of
LMC will become:
∆E12 = −
[
2t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 4t(x2 − x1)− 2θ∆q− cr21+r2
]
cr2
1+r2
18t(x2 − x1) < 0 (24)
Similarly, the profit change of IMC will become:
∆E22 =
[
−2t(x22 − x21)+ 8t(x2 − x1) + 2θ∆q + cr21+r2 ] cr21+r2
18t(x2 − x1) > 0 (25)
As |∆E22| − |∆E12| > 0, it can also be concluded that the market, as a whole, will benefit if IMC
adopts the subcontracting strategy.
From these solutions, some important implications can be obtained.
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Proposition 1. Local main contractors can adopt the subcontracting strategy to increase profit when
international main contractors choose a centralized structure. The overall market will benefit in terms of
increased profit.
Confirmation:
∣∣E21∣∣− ∣∣E11∣∣ > 0, ∣∣E22∣∣− ∣∣E12∣∣ < 0, ∣∣∣∣E21∣∣− ∣∣E11∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣E22∣∣− ∣∣E12∣∣∣∣ > 0 .
Proposition 2. International main contractors can adopt the subcontracting strategy to increase profit when
local main contractors choose a centralized structure. The overall market will benefit in terms of increased profit.
Confirmation:
∣∣E31∣∣− ∣∣E11∣∣ < 0, ∣∣E32∣∣− ∣∣E12∣∣ > 0, ∣∣∣∣E32∣∣− ∣∣E12∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣E31∣∣− ∣∣E11∣∣∣∣ > 0 .
6. Both Contractors Adopt the Decentralized Strategy
A situation where both main contractors adopt the decentralized subcontracting strategy is then
investigated. In this situation, IMC and LMC have a subcontracting relationship with a LSC. The cost
spillover effect is modelled, followed by the modelling of the quality spillover effect. For simplicity,
we assumed the coefficient of the spillover effect is consistent.
6.1. Scenario 4: Decentralized Strategy only Considering Cost Spillover Effect
The two main contractors will benefit from the cost spillover effect. The profit of LMC is E1 =(
p1 − c1+r1
)
x∗ and the profit of IMC is E2 =
(
p2 − c1+r2
)
(1− x∗).
By solving the Hotelling model, the prices of LMC and IMC are respectively set as:
p1 =
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1)− θ∆q + 2c1+r1 + c1+r2
3
(26)
p2 =
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + θ∆q + c1+r1 + 2c1+r2
3
(27)
The position of the same residual value of the owner is calculated by:
x∗ = x1 + x2 + 2
6
− θ∆q +
c
1+r1
− c1+r2
6t(x2 − x1) (28)
The profits of LMC and IMC are therefore:
E41 =
[
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1)− θ∆q + c1+r2 − c1+r1
]2
18t(x2 − x1) (29)
E42 =
[
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + θ∆q + c1+r1 − c1+r2 ]2
18t(x2 − x1) (30)
The position of the same residual value of the owner, price and profits of LMC and IMC are
compared with the previous scenarios. The results are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. The performance of LMC and IMC, when compared with the other three scenarios considering
cost spillover effect.
Indicators Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
The change of the position of
with the same residual value of
the owner ∆x∗
c
1+r2
− c1+r1
6t(x2−x1) −
r2c
1+r2
6t(x2−x1)
r1c
1+r1
6t(x2−x1)
Price change of LMC ∆p1 −
(
2cr1
3(1+r1)
+ cr23(1+r2)
)
− cr23(1+r2) −
2cr1
3(1+r1)
Price change of IMC ∆p2 −
(
cr1
3(1+r1)
+ 2cr23(1+r2)
)
− 2cr23(1+r2) −
cr1
3(1+r1)
Profit change of LMC ∆E1
(
u1+ c1+r2 −
c
1+r1
)(
c
1+r2
− c1+r1
)
18t(x2−x1)
[
u1+ c1+r2 −
c(1−r1)
1+r1
](
c
1+r2
−c
)
18t(x2−x1) < 0
[
u1+
c(1−r2)
1+r2
− c1+r1
](
c− c1+r1
)
18t(x2−x1) > 0
Price change of IMC ∆E2
(
u2+ c1+r1 −
c
1+r2
)(
c
1+r1
− c1+r2
)
18t(x2−x1)
[
u2− c1+r2 +
c(1−r1)
1+r1
](
c− c1+r2
)
18t(x2−x1) > 0
[
u2− c(1−r2)1+r2 +
c
1+r1
](
c
1+r1
−c
)
18t(x2−x1) < 0
Note: 2t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 4t(x2 − x1)− 2θ∆q = u1, −2t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 8t(x2 − x1) + 2θ∆q = u2.
Compared with Scenario 1 where both contractors adopt the centralized structure, both LMC
and IMC will adopt a price reduction strategy. It is also found that the market share of LMC and IMC
will also vary, depending on the change to the position with the same residual value of the owner.
When r1 = r2, such position remains unchanged, meaning that the market shares of LMC and IMC are
unchanged. On the other hand, when r1 > r2, such a position will move right on the Hotelling line,
meaning that the market share of LMC increases and the profit of LMC increases while the profit of
IMC decreases. When r1 < r2, such a position will move left on the Hotelling line, indicating that the
market share and profit of IMC increase while the market share and profit of LMC decrease.
Compared with Scenario 2 when only LMC adopts the decentralized strategy, the position with
the same residual value of the owner moves towards left of the Hotelling line, indicating that IMC
regains some market share through price reduction. This will also force LMC to further lower its price
at half the value of the price reduction of IMC. As a result, the profit of LMC decreases and the profit
of IMC increases.
Similarly, compared with Scenario 3 when only IMC adopts the decentralized strategy,
the indifference position of the owner moves towards right of the Hotelling line, indicating that
LMC regains some market share through price reduction. As a result, the profit of LMC increases and
the profit of IMC decreases. A proposition can therefore be obtained based on the above discussion.
6.2. Scenario 5: Decentralized Strategy Considering Cost Spillover Effect and Quality Spillover Effect
During cooperation involving the same subcontractor, the contractor with the higher quality level
will inevitably face the spillover of technology and knowledge, thus improving the production quality
of the inferior contractor. It is assumed that the quality spillover effect can improve the production
quality of the inferior contractor (which is assumed to be LMC) by a degree of α∆q (0 ≤ α ≤ 1).
The profit of LMC is E1 =
(
p1 − c1+r1
)
x∗ and the profit of IMC is E2 =
(
p2 − c1+r2
)
(1− x∗).
By solving the Hotelling model, the prices of LMC and IMC are, respectively:
p1 =
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1)− θ∆q(1− α) + 2c1+r1 + c1+r2
3
(31)
p2 =
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + θ∆q(1− α) + c1+r1 + 2c1+r2
3
(32)
The position with the same residual value of the owner is:
x∗ = x1 + x2 + 2
6
− θ∆q(1− α) +
c
1+r1
− c1+r2
6t(x2 − x1) (33)
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The profits of LMC and IMC are, respectively:
E51 =
[
t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 2t(x2 − x1)− θ∆q(1− α) + c1+r2 − c1+r1
]2
18t(x2 − x1) (34)
E52 =
[
−t(x22 − x21)+ 4t(x2 − x1) + θ∆q(1− α) + c1+r1 − c1+r2 ]2
18t(x2 − x1) (35)
The market share, price and profits of the two contractors considering cost and quality spillover
effect are compared with the same three scenarios. The results are shown in Table 3.
Mixed results are found when both cost and quality spillover effect are considered. Compared with
Scenario 1 when both contractors do not adopt the subcontracting strategy, the prices of LMC and IMC
decrease. However, whether the price reduction can lead to increased market share will be dependent
on the magnitude of the quality and cost spillover effect. For example, when αθ∆q > c1+r1 − c1+r2 (i.e.,
the benefit of quality spillover effect that LMC obtains exceeds the price difference of LMC and IMC
considering the cost spillover effect), the position with the same residual value of the owner will move
towards right of the Hotelling line, meaning that the market share LMC increases and that of IMC
decreases. Consequently, the profit of LMC increases and that of IMC decreases.
Compared with Scenario 2 when only LMC adopts the subcontracting strategy, it is found that
the market share, price and profit of the two contractors will be dependent on the magnitude of the
quality spillover effect (i.e., αθ∆q) and the cost benefit that IMC obtains through the cost spillover
effect (i.e., r2c1+r2 ).
It is interesting to find that compared to Scenario 3 when only IMC adopts the subcontracting
strategy, the adoption of subcontracting by LMC will always lead to increased market share and
increased profit. The price change will be dependent on the magnitude of the quality spillover effect
and the cost benefit that IMC obtains through the cost spillover effect (i.e., r1c1+r1 ).
Some useful implications can therefore be obtained.
Proposition 3. Considering both cost and quality spillover effects, regardless of what strategy the international
main contractor adopts, the local main contractor that has an inferior position can always choose the
subcontracting strategy to obtain better profit.
Confirmation:
∣∣E21∣∣− ∣∣E11∣∣ > 0, ∣∣E51∣∣− ∣∣E31∣∣ > 0 .
Proposition 4. Considering both cost and quality spillover effects, whether or not the international main
contractor should choose the subcontracting strategy is dependent on the magnitude of the quality spillover effect
and the coefficient of the cost spillover effect
When the quality spillover effect exceeds the cost benefit that can be obtained through the cost
spillover effect (i.e.,) α > r2c
θ∆q(1+r2)
, the international contractor will always adopt the centralized
strategy, as the adoption of a decentralized strategy can lead to reduced profit.
Confirmation:
∣∣E52∣∣− ∣∣E22∣∣ > 0.
When the quality spillover effect is below a certain level (i.e., α < r2c
θ∆q(1+r2)
), the international
main contractor can adopt the decentralized strategy to increase profit.
Confirmation:
∣∣E52∣∣− ∣∣E22∣∣ < 0.
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Table 3. The performance of LMC and IMC, when compared with the other three scenarios considering cost and quality spillover effect.
Indicators Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
The change of the position of with the
same residual value of the owner ∆x∗
αθ∆q+ c1+r2 −
c
1+r1
6t(x2−x1)
αθ∆q− r2c1+r2
6t(x2−x1)
αθ∆q+ r1c1+r1
6t(x2−x1) > 0
Price change of LMC ∆p1 −
(
2cr1
3(1+r1)
+ cr23(1+r2)
− αθ∆q3
)
−
(
cr2
3(1+r2)
− αθ∆q3
)
−
(
2cr1
3(1+r1)
− αθ∆q3
)
Price change of IMC ∆p2 −
(
cr1
3(1+r1)
+ 2cr23(1+r2)
+
αθ∆q
3
)
< 0 −
(
2cr2
3(1+r2)
+
αθ∆q
3
)
< 0 −
(
cr1
3(1+r1)
+
αθ∆q
3
)
< 0
Profit change of LMC ∆E1
(
u1+αθ∆q+ c1+r2 −
c
1+r1
)(
αθ∆q+ c1+r2 −
c
1+r1
)
18t(x2−x1)
(
u1+αθ∆q+ c1+r2 −
c(1−r1)
1+r1
)(
αθ∆q− cr21+r2
)
18t(x2−x1)
(
u1+αθ∆q+
c(1−r2)
1+r2
− c1+r1
)(
αθ∆q+ cr11+r1
)
18t(x2−x1) > 0
Profit change of IMC ∆E2
(
u2−αθ∆q+ c1+r1 −
c
1+r2
)(
c
1+r1
− c1+r2 −αθ∆q
)
18t(x2−x1)
(
u2−αθ∆q+ c(1−r1)1+r1 −
c
1+r2
)(
cr2
1+r2
−αθ∆q
)
18t(x2−x1)
(
u2−αθ∆q+ c1+r1 −
c(1−r2)
1+r2
)(
−αθ∆q− cr11+r1
)
18t(x2−x1) < 0
Note: 2t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 4t(x2 − x1)− 2θ∆q = u1, −2t
(
x22 − x21
)
+ 8t(x2 − x1) + 2θ∆q = u2.
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7. Numerical Simulation
A numerical simulation is conducted based on the above theoretical analysis to demonstrate the
selection of the subcontracting strategy of LMC and IMC in various situations.
It is assumed that the coefficient of owner’s disutility t equals to 100. In addition, LMC is located
at the position of x1 = 0.1 and IMC is located at the position of x2 = 0.8. The cost spillover factors
r1 and r2 vary from 0 to 5 in order to analyze the profit changes of LMC and IMC when their rivals
choose different strategies. The numerical simulation results when only the cost spillover effect is
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Figure 1a show the profit of LMC when it adopts the decentralized structure under th situation
when IMC adopts the centralized strategy, i.e., ithout subcontracting. Figure 1b shows the profit of
L C hen it follows ts competing contractor to adopt the subcontrac ing strategy. The simulation
shows that as LMC can always a pt the subcon racting strategy to ob ain better profit . In this
first situation, the new increased profit is related to the coefficient of the cost spillover eff ct of LMC
(Equatio (14)). Comparatively, when IMC has already implem nted the subcontra ing strategy, LMC
can still chose the decentralized strategy to obtain better profit. However, the new increased profit will
be depende t on th coefficient of the cost spillover effects of both LMC a d IMC (Equation (29)).
Similarly, Figure 2a,b show the profit of IMC when he competing contractor ( .e., LMC) ad pts a
centralized and decentral zed structure. Figure 2a shows that IMC can always dopt the subcontract ng
strategy to increase profit when the competing contractor ad pts a centralized structur . T e ne
increase fi will be dependent on the coefficient o the cost spillover effect of IMC (Equation (23)).
IMC can also adopt the subcontracting strategy to increase profit when LMC adopts the decentralized
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strategy. In this case, the new increased profit will be dependent on the coefficient of the cost spillover
effects of both LMC and IMC (Equation (30)).
Figure 3 demonstrates the simulation results when both the cost and quality spillover effects are
considered. The simulation results confirm that when the two types of spillover effects are considered,
LMC who has an inferior position in terms of quality, can always adopt the subcontracting strategy to
increase its project. When IMC does not adopt the subcontracting strategy, no quality spillover effect
will occur. Figure 1a shows that LMC can adopt the subcontracting strategy to increase profit and the
increased profit is only related to the coefficient of the cost spillover effect of LMC. On the other hand,
when IMC has already adopted the subcontracting strategy, once LMC adopts the subcontracting
strategy, quality spillover effect will occur. As can be seen from Figure 3, LMC can still adopt the
subcontracting strategy to increase profit. The new increased profit is related to the coefficient of
the cost spillover effects of LMC and IMC, as well as the magnitude of the quality spillover effect
(Equation (33)). For simplicity, Figure 3 only shows the relationship between the new increased profit
and the coefficient of cost spillover effect of IMC and the magnitude of the quality spillover effect.
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On the other hand, when LMC has already adopted the subcontracting strategy, IMC’s adoption
of the subcontracting strategy may not bring increased profit. The new profit will be dependent on
the coefficient of the cost spillover effect of LMC and IMC, as well as the magnitude of the quality
spillover effect, as shown in Figure 4.
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E nomic considerations when making subcontracting decisions are critical to the competitiveness
of contractors [5]. As such, understand ng the ec nomic implicatio s of sub ing on contractors
is important to achieve maximized benefits. Many studies have been c ducted on investigat g the
equilibrium locations, transport costs and margin l costs of two k y players when subco tracting is
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3291 15 of 17
involved, i.e., the duopoly in the market [35,36]. This study contributes to the inclusion of quality
level and two types of spillover effects in the competition. For example, it is found that the firm with
lower marginal cost can always adopt the subcontracting strategy to obtain benefit [35]. In this study,
it is found that the firm with the lower quality level can always adopt the subcontracting strategy to
obtain benefit.
8. Conclusions
Subcontracting has become an important strategy for reducing cost and diversifying political
and technological risks in the international construction market. During the subcontracting process,
international contractors also face the risk of knowledge spillover, which may pose a threat to the core
competitiveness of international contractors. It is therefore important to understand the consequences
of subcontracting decisions for both international and local contractors.
Using the Hotelling model, this study concludes that a local contractor that has an inferior
position can always adopt the subcontracting strategy to increase profit. This is independent of
the subcontracting strategy that the international contractor adopts. On the other hand, while the
decentralized structure can help international contractors gain a competitive advantage by lowering
the cost, the adoption of such a structure may expose international contractors to the quality spillover,
which can harm their profitability by improving the quality level of local contractors. Different from
the conclusions of Liu and Rajeev [32], their findings show that a decentralized supply chain structure
makes incentives more effective. Even if the upstream subcontractors have no cost advantage, such a
decentralized structure can still benefit both parties. However, this paper considers that the upstream
subcontractors are the same, which in turn leads to the consideration of quality spillover effects,
thus forming an unfair competition environment, which is closer to reality and leads to the result
of differentiation. A similar conclusion was obtained with Qi et al. [24], the higher spillover effect
brought about an increase in market competition, and also hindered the investment in the shared
supplier. Therefore, careful decisions of subcontracting should be made when international contractors
intend to enter new markets with a high degree of quality spillover. Based on the relationship between
the cost reduction coefficient and the spillover effect coefficient, this paper gives suggestions for the
subcontract decision-making of international main contractors.
It should be noted that this study has a few limitations. The above conclusion is based
on the assumption that a duopoly is modelled with the involvement of only one subcontractor.
In a competitive market, the competition and subcontracting structure may be more complicated.
In addition, it is assumed that all contractors are absolutely rational, meaning that they only focus on
profit to make decisions. In reality, the decisions of contractors may be influenced by other factors,
such as perception of fairness, political reasons, tax concessions or other forms of subsidies for local
investments. These factors are recommended to be included in future studies.
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